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LABORATORY MEASURE OF CHEATING PREDICTS
SCHOOL MISCONDUCT*
Alain Cohn and Michel Andre Marechal
Laboratory experiments provide insights into the drivers of cheating behaviour, but it is unclear to
what extent cheating in the laboratory generalises to the field. We conducted an experiment with
middle and high school students to test whether a common laboratory measure of cheating predicts
three types of school misconduct: (i) disruptiveness in class; (ii) homework non-completion; and (iii)
absenteeism. We find that students who cheat in the experimental task are more likely to misbehave
at school, suggesting that experimental measures of cheating generalise to rule violating behaviour in
naturally occurring environments.
Cheating, misconduct and other forms of rule violating behaviour are pervasive
problems in many important areas of social and economic life. Examples range from
scandals in the business world (e.g. Volkswagen’s recent emission fraud or interest and
exchange rate manipulations in the financial industry) to rigged sport competitions
(Duggan et al., 2002), rampant corruption in developing countries (Pande and Olken,
2012; Banerjee et al., 2013) and student and teacher cheating (Jacob and Levitt, 2003;
Levitt and Lin, 2015).
Given the prevalence and cost of dishonesty to society, a rapidly growing literature
has emerged with the aim to provide a better understanding of the determinants of
lying, cheating and stealing (see Ariely, 2012; Irlenbusch and Villeval, 2015; Shalvi
et al., 2015 for recent reviews). Due to its clandestine nature, dishonest behaviour is
typically difficult to measure reliably using observational field data (Zitzewitz, 2012). As
a consequence, the majority of empirical findings originates from controlled
laboratory environments.1
A widely used experimental paradigm to measure cheating is to instruct subjects to
perform a simple task of chance (e.g. flipping coins or rolling dice) and asking them to
report their outcomes. Because the actual outcomes are not observed by the
experimenter and only certain outcomes are rewarded, subjects face the temptation
to increase their earnings by misreporting their outcomes without any risk of getting
caught (Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011; Shalvi et al., 2011; Fischbacher and F€ollmi-Heusi,
2013; Cohn et al., 2014; Abeler et al., 2016; Marechal et al., 2017).2 Although cheating
cannot be detected at the individual level, researchers can measure cheating at the
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1 See Pierce and Balasubramanian (2015) for a survey of the literature on dishonest behaviour that uses
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earnings by sending deceptive messages to the receiver (Gneezy, 2005; Sutter, 2009).
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group level as the true distribution of the underlying random process is known.
Moreover, because higher earnings are less likely to be the result of chance, earnings
claimed by individual subjects can serve as a proxy for their cheating behaviour. While
this paradigm has been used extensively to study the determinants of dishonesty and
rule violating behaviour, the extent to which the insights gained from the laboratory
can be extrapolated to naturally occurring environments remains unclear. Common
objections to the generalisability of laboratory experiments are that subjects make low-
stakes decisions in artificial environments and that they know their behaviour is being
recorded and analysed (Levitt and List, 2007; Falk and Heckman, 2009).
In this article, we investigate whether cheating in the laboratory predicts rules violating
behaviour in the field. To this end, we matched a common laboratory measure of
cheating with teacher evaluations of students’ misbehaviour in school. We experimen-
tally measured cheating by asking the students to toss 10 coins in private and report their
outcomes. Students only received financial rewards when reporting ‘heads’ and thus had
a financial incentive to misreport their outcomes for unsuccessful coin flips. Our
measures of school misbehaviour are based on the US National Education Longitudinal
Survey. Specifically, we asked teachers to assess their students along three dimensions:
disruptiveness in class, non-completion of homework and absenteeism. These measures
of school misconduct are important as they have been shown to reliably predict future
educational achievement and labourmarket outcomes (Segal, 2013; Autor et al., 2015).3
We expect the laboratory measure of cheating to be predictive of school misconduct
because both cheating and school misconduct require people to break rules.
We found a positive and significant correlation between the laboratory measure of
cheating and students’ misbehaviour in school. This relationship remains strong after
adding controls for age, gender, nationality, school level, parental education and
cognitive ability. Our estimates indicate that the difference in school misbehaviour
between students who claimed 10 coins (presumably cheaters) and those who claimed
five coins (presumably honest individuals) is, on average, 0.53 standard deviations. For
comparison, we observe the same gap in school misbehaviour between students whose
cognitive abilities (i.e. crystallised intelligence) differ by 2.7 standard deviations.
Together, these results suggest that the cheating paradigm from the laboratory
provides an externally valid measure of rule violating behaviour in the field.
Our article contributes to several strands of the literature. First, a growing number of
studies combine laboratory andfield data from the same subjects to examine the external
validity of laboratory measures of behaviour.4 For example, Karlan (2005) found that
second-mover behaviour in a trust game correlates with the likelihood of loan repayment
among participants of amicrocredit programme in Peru.5 Using experimental measures
3 Disruptive and non-compliant behaviour in school also seem to matter for students’ current academic
performance as we found negative and significant correlations between students’ self-reported grade point
average (GPA) and the three measures of school misbehaviour (disruptiveness: p = 0.001, homework:
p < 0.001, absenteeism: p = 0.002, Spearman tests).
4 See Camerer (2015) for an overview of experimental studies linking behaviour in the laboratory and
field.
5 Benz and Meier (2008), Carpenter and Myers (2010), Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011), Burks et al. (2015)
and Cohn et al. (2015a) provide further evidence for positive associations between laboratory and field
measures of prosociality.
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of present bias, Sutter et al. (2013) show that more impatient children and adolescents
aremore likely to buy alcohol and cigarettes, aremore likely to be obese and are less likely
to save money.6 Our findings suggest that cheating in the laboratory provides a reliable
indicator of rule violating behaviour in the field. Only a few studies analysed the
relationship between rule violation in the laboratory and the field. Hanna and Wang
(2017) examined cheating in a sample of government nurses in India. They found that
nurses who cheated more in a dice task also tended to show up at work less often. Cohn
et al. (2015b) conducted a coin tossing experiment with inmates from a maximum-
security prison. They found a positive correlation between claimed earnings from the
coin tosses and misconduct in prison (e.g. illegal drug possession or aggression against
guards and other inmates). However, the latter studies used rather unusual participants
drawn from the extreme ends of the honesty distribution. Recently, Dai et al. (2018)
reported a die-rolling experiment with public transport passengers showing that the
proportion of fully dishonest participants is higher among those who did not hold a valid
ticket. It is reassuring that these papers provide evidence that is consistent with our study
despite using different methods and subject pools.7
Second, our article also speaks to a growing literature on school misconduct as
manifestations of non-cognitive skills.8 For example, Segal (2013) shows that students
misbehaving in eighth grade are almost three times less likely to finish high school and
have almost 10% lower earnings as adults relative to non-disruptive students. Bertrand
and Pan (2013) found that behavioural problems in school are more prevalent among
boys, especially if they grow up in single-mother households. This finding may explain
the widening gender gap in academic achievement in the US and other developed
countries (Goldin et al., 2006; Becker et al., 2010; Fortin et al., 2015). We find that male
students cheat significantly more and that this gender difference in the coin tossing
task explains about one-fifth of the gender gap in school misbehaviour. Our article also
links to an emerging literature on the relationship between economic preferences and
non-cognitive skills (Almlund et al., 2011; Becker et al., 2012). The identified
relationship between cheating behaviour and school misconduct raises the possibility
that intrinsic honesty and expressions of non-cognitive skills at school share a common
underlying mechanism.
1. Design
We conducted a paper-and-pencil experiment with 162 students from eight classes in
two Swiss public schools – one middle and one high school. Students were between 12
and 20 years old, and 43% of them were female. They were informed that their data
6 Meier and Sprenger (2010) show that experimentally elicited present bias is a reliable predictor of credit
card borrowing.
7 List (2009) analysed a subsample of 17 sellers from open air markets for which he observed laboratory
and field behaviour. He found that sellers who breached collusive agreements in contextualised laboratory
experiments were also more likely to do so in the field. More recently, Potters and Stoop (2016) and Kr€oll
and Rustagi (2017) find that subjects who cheat in the laboratory are also less likely to report ‘accidental’
overpayments and are more likely to adulterate milk with water, respectively.
8 Externalising behaviour and misconduct in school are typically seen as expressions of non-cognitive skills
and relate to personality traits such as agreeableness and conscientiousness (Ehrler et al., 1999; Almlund
et al., 2011).
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will be treated confidentially and that we will not reveal their data to others, including
their teachers and school authorities. The experiment took place in the classrooms in
absence of the teachers. We set up a mobile laboratory and installed partition walls to
shield subjects from sight and, therefore, ensure privacy (see Figure A1 in online
Appendix A).9 Although participation was voluntary, all students gave their consent to
participate in the study. We ran the experiment simultaneously in all four classes at
each school to avoid cross-talk between subjects.
In the first part of the experiment, we asked subjects some basic socio-demographic
questions such as age, gender, nationality and parental education (see Table 1 for
descriptive statistics). In the second part, we measured their cognitive ability using two
short tests from Dohmen et al. (2010): the word fluency test and the symbol–digit
correspondence test.10 Both tests are related to working memory and processing speed,
which is often part of the reason children thrive or struggle in school, but they measure
distinct concepts of reasoning capability (Carroll, 1993).11 The word fluency test
measures ‘crystallised intelligence’ (ability to solve problems using knowledge and
experience) by asking subjects to list as many different animals as possible within 90
seconds. Subjects received one point for each correct and unique animal named. The
symbol–digit correspondence test measures ‘fluid intelligence’ (innate ability to solve
problems) and consists of decoding sets of unfamiliar symbols into single digits as fast
as possible within 90 seconds. For each set, subjects had to write down the correct
numbers under a grid of nine symbols using a predefined mapping between symbols
and digits. Subjects scored one point for each correct symbol–digit pair.
The last part of the experiment comprised the coin tossing task – our laboratory
measure of cheating. Subjects first opened an envelope containing 10 coins, each worth
0.5 Swiss francs (about US $0.55). Then, they were instructed to toss each coin in private
and report their outcomes on paper. For every coin toss for which subjects reported
the outcome ‘heads’ they were allowed to keep the coin; they had to put the coin back
into the envelope otherwise. Participants thus faced a financial incentive to cheat by
misreporting the outcomes of their coin flips without any risk of getting caught.12
The stakes were considerable as the maximum possible payoff in this task corresponds
roughly to half the amount students of similar age receive in pocket money every week
(e.g. see www.budgetberatung.ch). After completing the coin tossing task, subjects were
asked to put their envelope with the remaining coins into a container.
Teachers were asked to assess their students along three dimensions: disruptiveness
in class, non-completion of homework and absenteeism. For each item, the teachers
evaluated the students on a scale from ‘never misbehaves’ (= 0) to ‘always misbehaves’
(= 6). These measures of school misbehaviour were inspired by the US National
9 We took these measures to mitigate potential confidentiality concerns. Such concerns could, in
principle, lead to an overestimation of the relationship between our laboratory measure of cheating and
misbehaviour at school if the most well-behaved students in the class were more worried about data privacy.
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
10 The two cognitive ability tests are based on submodules of theWechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) –
one of the most frequently used intelligence tests.
11 Test scores are positively correlated in our sample (Spearman’s q = 0.423, p < 0.001).
12 Nine subjects reported a lower number of heads than the number of coins they actually took out of the
envelope. For our analysis, we use the number of coins taken as the outcome variable. Our results remain the
same if we use the reported number of heads instead (see Table B1 in online Appendix B).
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Educational Longitudinal Survey – a study that followed a nationally representative
sample of more than 20,000 students over several years. We chose these measures of
school misbehaviour as they have been shown to reliably predict future educational
achievement and labour market outcomes (Segal, 2013; Autor et al., 2015). Because
the three items are strongly correlated (Cronbach’s a = 0.718) we created an index of
school misbehaviour using the unweighted average of all three items. Our regression
analysis uses the school misbehaviour index to reduce the influence of measurement
error, but we also report the results, using the three measures of misbehaviour
separately (see Table B2 in online Appendix B). We matched teachers’ evaluations
with the experimental data, using identification codes to preserve subjects’ anonymity.
2. Results
The results indicate that a significant proportion of the subjects cheated by inflating
their number of successful coin tosses. Figure 1 shows that the empirical distribution of
coins taken is shifted towards a higher number relative to the honest benchmark
provided by the binomial distribution. The outcomes 10, nine and eight coins are
significantly overrepresented (p < 0.001 for all three outcomes, binomial tests),
whereas two, three, four and five coins are significantly underrepresented (p = 0.011,
p < 0.001, p = 0.032 and p = 0.055, binomial tests). On average, the students took
62.8% of the coins in the envelopes (95% confidence interval: 60.0%, 65.7%).13
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean SD
Age 14.938 2.015
Female 0.432 0.497
Swiss nationality 0.673 0.471
High school 0.488 0.501
Parental education 0.364 0.483
Crystallised intelligence 20.401 7.471
Fluid intelligence 43.370 10.331
Grade point average (self-reported) 4.632 0.535
Absenteeism 0.981 1.522
Disruptiveness 0.981 1.530
Homework non-completion 1.815 1.991
School misbehaviour index 1.259 1.355
Notes. This table reportsdescriptive statistics.Age ismeasured in years. Female, Swiss nationality, high school and
parental education are dummy variables. Parental education equals to one if at least one parent has a university
degree. Crystallised and fluid intelligence are based on the scores from the word fluency test and the symbol–
digit correspondence test, respectively. Grade point average is the self-reported grade point average on a scale
from 1 (worst) to 6 (best). Disruptiveness, homework non-completion and absenteeism are three measures of
school misconduct, based on the teachers’ assessments on a scale from ‘never misbehaves’ (= 0) to ‘always
misbehaves’ (= 6). School misbehaviour index is the average of the three items of school misconduct. The
number of observations is 162, except for age (N = 161) because one subject did not state his age.
13 If we use reported outcomes instead, the percentage of heads is 61.6% (95% confidence interval: 58.9%,
64.3%).
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Assuming that none of the participants cheated to his or her disadvantage, we estimate
that 25.7% of the coins were misreported.14
We also analysed individual determinants of cheating using multivariate regression
analysis. Higher earnings are less likely to be the result of chance. Thus, we use the
number of coins each subject took as a proxy for cheating in the regression analysis.
Column (1) of Table 2 indicates that female students behaved more honestly than
male students as they took significantly less coins (p < 0.000, t-test).15 Moreover, we
found that high school students took significantly less coins than those from middle
school after controlling for age (p = 0.011, t-test), which could be explained by less
deviant students selecting into higher education. Earnings in the coin tossing task and
the two measures of cognitive ability are negatively correlated. However, the
correlations do not reach statistical significance, neither for crystallised nor for fluid
intelligence (p = 0.599 and p = 0.744, t-tests).
We next examined whether our experimental measure of cheating is related to
school misconduct. Panels (a) to (c) in Figure 2 illustrate the average scores for the
three measures of school misconduct for subjects who took more than five coins (i.e.
subjects who presumably cheated) and those who took five coins or less.16 Together,
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Fig. 1. Students’ Behaviour in the Coin Tossing Task
Notes. Thefigure indicates that a significant proportion of students cheated in the coin tossing task.
The empirical distribution of coins taken (green bars) is shifted towards higher earnings relative to
the binomial distribution implied by fully honest behaviour (blue bars). Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
14 The calculation of percentage of misreported coin tosses is straightforward if we assume that none of
the participants cheated to his or her disadvantage (Houser et al., 2012). Let h be the percentage of coins
taken from the envelopes and m be the percentage of misreported coin tosses. For any given coin toss, a
participant who cheats keeps it with a probability of 1. By contrast, a participant who is truthful keeps each
coin with a probability of 0.5. Thus, the percentage of coins taken from the envelope is
h = m 9 1 + (1  m) 9 0.5 = 0.5 9 (1 + m). Solving the equation yields the percentage of misreported
coin tosses m = 2 9 h  1.
15 Dreber and Johannesson (2008) document a similar gender difference in dishonest behaviour.
16 Five coins correspond to the median number of claims. Alternatively, Figure A2 in online Appendix A
illustrates that there is a monotonic relationship for all three measures of school misbehaviour when the data
is split by tertiles of coins taken.
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the three panels highlight that behaviour in the coin tossing task is positively associated
with each measure of school misbehaviour. Subjects who took more than five coins
score 0.5 points (or 72%) higher on disruptiveness in class, 0.9 points (or 69%) higher
on non-completion of homework and 0.4 points (or 61%) higher on absenteeism
relative to the other subjects. Using the raw data, we find statistically significant
correlations between the number of coins taken and disruptiveness and homework
non-completion (p = 0.003 and p = 0.020), but the correlation with absenteeism fails
to reach statistical significance (p = 0.136, Spearman tests).
We additionally estimated regression models to control for factors that might jointly
influence cheating and school misbehaviour. In the regression analysis, we use the
school misbehaviour index, which is the average score of all three individual measures
of school misbehaviour (see Figure A3 in online Appendix A for a graph depicting the
distribution of the school misbehaviour index). Our main results are similar if we
Table 2
Determinants of Behaviour in the Coin Task and School Misbehaviour
(1)
(2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable No. coins School misbehaviour index
No. coins taken 0.150** 0.145**
(0.015) (0.015)
Age 0.038 0.489*** 0.472*** 0.467***
(0.731) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Female 1.061*** 0.621** 0.663** 0.817**
(0.000) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)
Swiss nationality 0.411 0.143 0.186 0.127
(0.140) (0.226) (0.206) (0.440)
High school 1.018* 1.360*** 1.033* 1.181**
(0.050) (0.008) (0.054) (0.030)
Parental education 0.120 0.462 0.532 0.514
(0.657) (0.190) (0.154) (0.163)
Crystallised intelligence 0.080 0.267** 0.279**
(0.599) (0.044) (0.035)
Fluid intelligence 0.041 0.040 0.034
(0.744) (0.771) (0.808)
Constant 8.145*** 6.321*** 6.239*** 5.056**
(0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.020)
Observations 161 161 161 161
R2 0.226 0.310 0.333 0.303
Notes. This table reports OLS coefficient estimates. p-values are reported in parenthesis. In column (1), we
regress the number of coins taken in the coin tossing task on a set of individual characteristics and two
measures of cognitive ability. Age is measured in years. Female, Swiss nationality, high school and parental
education are dummy variables. Parental education equals to one if at least one parent has a university
degree. Crystallised and fluid intelligence are based on the scores from the word fluency test and the symbol–
digit correspondence test, respectively. Both cognitive ability measures are normalised to have a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one. In columns (2)–(4), the dependent variable is the school misbehaviour
index, which is constructed by averaging the three items of school misconduct, including disruptiveness in
class, failure to complete homework and absenteeism (all measured on a scale from ‘never misbehaves’ (= 0)
to ‘always misbehaves’ (= 6)). Because the models in columns (2)–(4) use teacher evaluations, we computed
p-values that are robust to clustering at the class level. To account for the low number of clusters we applied
the wild cluster bootstrap procedure (Cameron et al., 2008) using Webb’s (2013) 6-point distribution of
weights (see online Appendix for a description of the procedure). The number of observations is 161 instead
of 162 because one subject did not state his age. Significance levels: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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analyse each measure of school misbehaviour separately (see Table B2 in online
Appendix B).
Column (2) of Table 2 confirms that behaviour in the coin tossing task is
significantly related to school misbehaviour when controlling for age, gender,
nationality, education level and parental education. A higher number of coins taken
is associated with increased behavioural problems in school (p = 0.015).17 Interest-
ingly, in addition to pocketing a lower number of coins, female and high school
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Fig. 2. Behaviour in the Coin Task and School Misconduct
Notes. The figure shows that, relative to those who took five coins or less (i.e. five coins
corresponds to the median), students who took more than five coins (i.e. those who presumably
cheated to a greater extend) disrupt the class to a larger degree (a), fail to do their homework
more often (b) and are more frequently absent from school (c). Error bars indicate the standard
error of the mean (adjusted for clustering at the class level). Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.
17 We computed p-values that are robust to clustering at the class level. To account for the low number of
clusters we applied the wild cluster bootstrap procedure (Cameron et al., 2008) using Webb’s (2013) 6-point
distribution of weights (see online Appendix for a description of the procedure).
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students also misbehave less frequently (p = 0.015 and p < 0.008, respectively). The
model reported in column (3) additionally controls for cognitive ability to address
potential issues of third variables that correlate with both school misbehaviour and
dishonesty.18 We find that crystallised intelligence is negatively associated with school
misbehaviour (p = 0.044), but fluid intelligence is not (p = 0.771). While differences
in cognitive ability explain some variation in disruptive and non-compliant behaviour,
the predictive power of the coin tossing task for school misbehaviour remains high
after controlling for key background characteristics as well as cognitive ability
(p = 0.015). The coefficient estimate implies that the difference in school misbe-
haviour between students who took 10 coins (presumably cheaters) and those who
took five coins (presumably honest individuals) is more than 0.7 points (or 0.53
standard deviations) on average. For comparison, it would require students to differ by
2.7 standard deviations in cognitive ability (i.e. crystallised intelligence) to produce the
same difference in school misbehaviour. The difference in school misbehaviour
between presumable cheaters and honest students is also larger than the widely
discussed gender gap in misbehaviour (Bertrand and Pan, 2013). In column (4) of
Table 2, we removed our laboratory measure of cheating from the regression model
and found that the gender coefficient increases from 0.663 to 0.817. This suggests
that gender differences in experimentally elicited rule violating behaviour explain
almost one-fifth of the gender gap in school misbehaviour.19
3. Conclusion
In this article, we examined whether a common laboratory measure of cheating is a
reliable predictor of rule violating behaviour in the field. We present evidence on the
link between the rule violating behaviour in the laboratory and field, using middle and
high school students. We combined experimental data from an incentivised coin
tossing task with measures of disruptive and non-compliant behaviour at school. Our
main result is that students who presumably cheated more in the coin tossing task also
misbehave more often at school. The relationship holds when controlling for students’
socio-economic background and cognitive ability.
Our findings contribute to the active debate about the generalisability of laboratory
experiments i.e. whether data obtained in the laboratory can be extrapolated to
naturally occurring environments (Levitt and List, 2007; Falk and Heckman, 2009). We
find a significant relationship between laboratory and field measures of rule violating
behaviour despite differences across the two settings, including the context of the
choice situation and the degree of scrutiny – factors which have been argued to make
inferences from lab to field environments difficult. Our findings concur with very
recent results from studies that document positive correlations between lab and field
measures of dishonesty (Potters and Stoop, 2016; Kr€oll and Rustagi, 2017; Dai et al.
18 For example, Ruffe and Tobol (2017) and Deckers et al. (2016) found negative associations between
cognitive ability and immoral behaviour.
19 We found very similar results using the pooled Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition method – a technique
that was initially developed for studying gender gaps in labour market earnings (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca,
1973).
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2018). The fact that these correlations emerge from independent studies that use
different methods and subject pools is reassuring for the usefulness of laboratory
measures of behaviour, especially cheating behaviour, as cheating has been conjec-
tured to be more context-sensitive than other types of behaviour, such as cooperative-
ness and consumption choices (Abeler et al., 2014).
In a broader sense, our article also adds to a nascent literature on the relationship
between economic preferences and non-cognitive skills (Almlund et al., 2011; Becker
et al., 2012). Our results raise the possibility that intrinsic honesty and expressions of
non-cognitive skills at school share a common underlying mechanism.
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